Overuse of medical care is often attributed to the problem of “induced demand” by an informed expert: the doctor, who is better informed than the patient, can steer demand and potentially lead patients to buy more than they would if they had the same information as the doctor. This can occur for several reasons: the doctor may have a financial interest in selling expensive treatments, but may also evaluate costs and benefits of treatment differently. On the other hand, it has been argued that patients in developing countries “demand” more powerful and expensive treatment than is really necessary. We conducted a randomized controlled trial in Bamako, Mali designed to investigate the extent to which patients versus providers drive over-demand of antimalarials. We find evidence of patient-driven demand: holding doctors' financial incentives constant, directly informing patients (as opposed to just doctors) about an available antimalarial subsidy increases use of the subsidy by 30 percent, significantly increasing the share of patients treated for malaria. This increase is driven by patients least likely to have malaria, leading to a worse match between treatment and likely cause of illness.