Sylvain Champonnois


Contact Information

Rady School of Management
Otterson Hall, Room 3S151
9500 Gilman Drive #0553
La Jolla, CA 92093-0553
Phone: (858) 822-7456
Fax: (858) 534-0744

Research Areas

Corporate finance
International finance
Industrial organization

Industry Areas

Financial architecture and corporate investment
Estimation of size distributions
Mutual funds and asset pricing

Personal website

Sylvain Champonnois

Assistant Professor of Finance

Champonnois' main research interests are corporate finance, international finance and industrial organization. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University. He was a Lamfalussy Fellow at the European Central Bank in 2005. While at Princeton, he served as a teaching assistant on courses dealing with corporate finance and accounting, international macroeconomics and the regulation of international financial markets.


Comparing Financial Systems: A Structural Analysis (2010)
Industries with small firms (compared to industries with large firms) raise more market finance (relative to intermediated) in the UK than in Italy or Spain. Using a structural model, this implies that the cost of market finance (relative to intermediated finance) is lower in the UK than in Italy or Spain. In particular, the model controls for financing frictions and endogenous firm sizes and shows that industries with small firms raise disproportionately more market finance (relative to intermediated finance) in countries with a lower relative cost of market finance. 

Bank Competition and Economic Stability: the Role of Monetary Policy (2010)

The competition between banks propagates and amplifies shocks through adverse feedback loops on the liability and asset sides of banks. We characterize how the central bank can mitigate the vulnerability of the economy through a bank lending channel (interest-rate policy) or direct interventions in the banking sector (balance-sheet policies). 

The Limits of Market Discipline: Proprietary Trading adn Aggregate Risk (2010)

The risk-taking by entrepreneurs and the demand for risky securities by risk-neutral fund managers are mutually reinforcing: risk-neutral fund managers benefit more from the upside of risk than risk-averse investors  and they induce more risk-taking. A high supply of risky assets with low risk premium takes place when the aggregate risk-aversion is low. 

What Determines the Distribution of Firm Sizes? (2008)

This paper analyzes the qualitative and quantitative determinants of firm size heterogeneity. We present a simple theory of the firm in which firm size dispersion increases with goods substitutability (an industry-specific factor), with external investors risk-tolerance and labor market flexibility (two country-specific factors). Empirically, in an industry-country panel, industry characteristics explain 3 times more of the differences in firm size distribution than country characteristics.

Work in Progress

Unverifiable Risk, Bank Competition and the Resilience of the Financial sector (2010)

When bank loan contracts are incomplete and the entrepreneur's risk decision is not describable ex ante and verifiable ex post ("unverifiable risk"), aggregate risk is higher and the financial sector is more vulnerable to adverse shocks. An increase in bank competition mitigates the risk-shifting incentives and improves the resilience of the financial sector.

The Impact of Financial Integration on Investment and Financing
After financial integration, the larger firms raise more external finance, the smaller firms raise less or no external finance but overall, aggregate investment and welfare increases.

Investment Behavior during a Financial Crisis: New Evidence from International Equity Funds, with Harald Hau, Joel Peress, Massimo Massa and H�l�ne Rey