A decision-maker (DM) must choose one of \( n \geq 2 \) projects or an outside option. An agent is privately informed about the benefit of each project and shares the DM’s preferences, except that he does not internalize the (commonly known) cost of project implementation. We study when and how the agent will distort his preference ranking in order to persuade the DM to not choose the outside option. We show that equilibrium communication is characterized by pandering: the agent excessively recommends good-looking projects, even when both parties would be better off with some other project. Nevertheless, recommendations in favor of worse-looking projects become more credible when pitched against a stronger slate of alternatives. More generally, we show how asymmetries in publicly observable or hard information about projects impacts credible communication of the agent’s soft or non-verifiable information. Implications for organizations and other settings such as buyer-seller relationships are discussed, including responses to alleviate the communication distortions.