

Anomalies and News^ψ

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Abstract

Using a sample of 97 stock return anomalies, we find that anomaly returns are 50% higher on corporate news days and are 6 times higher on earnings announcement days. These results could be explained by dynamic risk, mispricing via biased expectations, and data mining. We develop and conduct unique tests to differentiate between these three frameworks. Our results are most consistent with the idea that anomaly returns are the result of biased expectations, which are at least partially corrected upon news arrival.

Keywords: News, cross-sectional return predictability, earnings announcements, market efficiency, dynamic risk, biased expectations, expectational errors.

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Academic research shows that a large number of observable firm-characteristics can predict the cross-section of stock returns (see Fama (1998), Nagel (2013), and McLean and Pontiff (2016)). This “anomalies” research goes back to at least Ball and Brown (1968) and Blume and Husick (1973), yet more than four decades later, academics still disagree on what causes this return predictability.

There are three popular explanations for cross-sectional predictability. First, the predictability could be the result of cross-sectional differences in risk, reflected in discount rates (e.g., Fama (1991, 1998)). In this framework, cross-sectional return predictability is expected because return differences simply reflect ex-ante differences in discount rates that were used to value the stocks.

The second explanation comes from behavioral finance, and argues that return predictability reflects mispricing (e.g., Barberis and Thaler (2003)). For example, the marginal investor may have biased expectations of cash flows, and the anomaly variables are correlated with these mistakes across stocks. When new information arrives, investors update their beliefs, which corrects prices and creates return-predictability.

The third explanation is data mining. As Fama (1998) points out, academics have likely tested thousands of variables, so it is not surprising to find that some of them predict returns in-sample, even if in reality none of them do.¹

In order to differentiate between the three explanations of cross-sectional return predictability, we compare predictability on days where firm-specific

¹ Recognition of a “multiple testing bias” in all types of empirical research dates at least back to Bonferroni (1935) and is stressed more recently in the finance literature by Harvey, Lin, and Zhu (2016), McLean and Pontiff (2016), and Linnainmaa and Roberts (2017).

information is publicly released to days where we do not observe news. We use the 97 anomaly variables studied in McLean and Pontiff (2016), each of which has been reported to predict the cross-section of stock returns in a published academic study. Days with firm-specific information releases are defined as earnings announcements or days with a Dow Jones news item.

We find that anomaly returns are 50% higher on corporate news days and are 6 times higher on earnings announcement days.² We find similar effects on both the long and short sides, i.e., anomaly-shorts have lower returns and anomaly-longs have higher returns on news days. These effects appear to be related to firm-specific news, as anomaly returns are not higher on days with macroeconomic news. The findings are also not explained by a day-of-the week effect, nor are they explained by extreme returns causing news, as anomaly returns are not elevated on extreme return days that do not also have news. We discuss how our results relate to each of the three explanations of cross-sectional return predictability below.

Systematic risk. A standard, static risk-factor model (e.g., Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), and Fama and French (2015)) has a stock's expected returns as a product of its systematic risk exposures ("betas") and their corresponding risk premiums. In these factor models, a firm-specific news event will not change a stock's expected return because it is unrelated to either the time invariant betas or risk premiums. Therefore, our finding of predictably higher

² Stock returns are unconditionally higher on earnings announcement days (Franzini and Lamont (2006)). Savor and Wilson (2016) attempt to explain this fact. This is not the effect that we document nor the one we want to explain; our main specifications control for this effect through the use of earnings announcement dummy variables. We find that anomaly-long (anomaly-short) returns are higher (lower) on earnings and news days while controlling for the fact that stock returns are higher on earnings announcement days.

anomaly returns on information days appears at odds with static, risk-factor models.

However, our results could be consistent with dynamic risk models, which allow for time-varying risk premia and time-varying betas. Papers in this spirit include Patton and Verado (2012), who find that a stock's beta with respect to the market portfolio is higher on earnings announcement days, and explain this finding with a dynamic learning model, and Savor and Wilson (2016), who develop a dynamic risk-based model to explain why stock returns are higher on earnings announcement days.

We consider both time-varying risk premia and time-varying betas as potential explanations for our asymmetric result that anomaly-longs have higher returns on news days and anomaly-shorts have lower returns on news days. We show that time-varying risk-premia cannot explain our result. We use a variety of fixed effects to absorb any daily variation in risk factors and our results hardly change with the inclusion these effects.

When considering time-varying betas, however, we find mixed results. When we examine the market betas of anomaly stocks, we find no asymmetric effects for anomaly-longs and anomaly-shorts. However, when we consider time-varying exposure to an aggregate anomaly factor, we do find an asymmetry: anomaly-longs increase their factor betas on earnings days, and anomaly-shorts decrease their factor betas on earnings days. This could explain why anomaly-longs have higher returns on news days while anomaly-shorts have lower returns on news days. However, even after controlling for these changing betas on earnings days, we still

find that anomaly-longs have higher returns and anomaly-shorts have lower returns on earnings days. The inclusion of the betas has virtually no impact on the magnitude or statistical significance of the earnings day effect.

It could be the case that our aggregate anomaly factor is not the “right” risk factor, and if we had the “right” factor it would explain our results. However, it’s important to note what kind of dynamic risk model would be necessary to generate our findings. Using quintile portfolios, we find that anomaly returns are 8.7 times *higher* on earnings day for long-side stocks and 7.53 times *lower* for short-side stocks. If these returns reflect priced risk, then the underlying asset pricing model would require some stocks to have discount rates that are 8.7 times higher on earnings announcement days and other stocks to be 7.53 times less risky on earnings announcement days. Then, after the announcements, risk would return back to the pre-announcement level.

Mispricing due to biased-expectations. In the biased expectations framework investors are too optimistic about some stocks and too pessimistic about others, and the anomaly variables are correlated with these biases. When new information arrives in the form of an earnings announcement or other news story, investors update their beliefs, resulting in a correction to the stock price. To illustrate this intuition, we consider a simple representative agent model (further elaborated in the appendix) with an agent that has biased expectations about future cashflows that are corrected with the arrival of public cash flow news. The end result is that firms for which the agent has overly optimistic (pessimistic) cashflow expectations

have negative (positive) news-day returns. The earnings announcement day and news day returns that we document are consistent with this intuition.

To better test the idea that biased expectations explain stock return anomalies, we also study analyst forecast errors. We find that analysts' earnings forecasts are too low for anomaly-longs and too high for anomaly-shorts, i.e. analysts' earnings forecasts are too optimistic for anomaly-shorts and too pessimistic for anomaly-longs. This is consistent with biased expectations as an explanation for stock return anomalies, but not risk, as it is difficult to see how even dynamic betas can explain why analysts' earnings forecasts are biased. However, as we explain below, our result concerning analyst forecast errors does not rule out data mining as an explanation for stock returns anomalies.

The idea that biased expectations can explain stock return anomalies can be traced to Basu (1977), DeBondt and Thaler (1985), and La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), who argue that biased expectations can explain long-term reversal and value strategies. More recent models of stock return anomalies that are based on biased expectations include Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001). In these models, long-term reversal and price-to-fundamental anomalies are caused by biased expectations about future cash flows and a price correction that occurs when new information is made public.

Data mining. Our finding that anomaly returns are higher on information days could be consistent with data mining, as could our finding that anomaly variables predict analysts' forecast error. To see why, consider the fact that stocks

with high (low) ex-post returns over a given period are likely to have also had high (low) returns on news days and earnings announcement days during the same period. Put differently, stocks with high (low) monthly returns over the last month probably had good (bad) news during the month, which explains why the returns were high (low) in that month.

We show that this intuition is supported empirically; stocks with high (low) monthly returns in month t , regardless of their anomaly portfolio membership, tend to have especially high (low) returns on earnings days and on news days during month t . Similarly, we also show that stocks with high (low) monthly returns in month t that also announced earnings in month t had analysts' earnings forecasts that turned out to be too low (high) during the same month.

To address the data mining issue we conduct several tests. First, we re-estimate our main daily regression tests while controlling for the contemporaneous monthly stock return and its relation with earnings day and news day returns. We find that, even after controlling for monthly returns, anomaly returns are still high on news days and earnings days, and anomaly variables still predict analyst forecast errors. Second, we build an out-of-sample anomaly variable that is constructed solely with out-of-sample anomalies. We find that the anomaly returns are significant out-of-sample, and higher on earnings days and news days. Moreover, the out-of-sample anomaly variable predicts analyst forecast errors. These findings seem to contradict the idea that data mining can alone explain why anomaly returns are higher on information days.

Previous Literature. Our paper builds on earlier studies that report higher anomaly returns on earnings announcement days (e.g., Bernard and Thomas (1989), Ball and Kothari (1991), Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992), La Porta et al. (1994), Sloan (1996), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006)). Variations of the literature include, Edelen, Ince, and Kadlec (2016) who show that institutional trading is related to anomaly returns around earnings announcement days, and Wu, Zhang, and Zhang (2010) and Liu and Zhang (2014), who argue that investment-based models imply higher risk premiums on earnings announcement days.

Our paper differs from this literature in several ways. First, we investigate not only earnings announcement days but also more than 6 million news days that do not coincide with Compustat earnings announcements. We use a broad set of 97 anomalies that not only gives us more statistical power than previous studies, but also allows us to draw novel comparisons between categories of anomalies. Our paper is also the first to relate such a broad set of anomalies to analyst forecast errors. Our forecast error results are important because they are not subject to the joint-hypothesis problem and are in agreement with our daily stock return findings.

Previous studies do not consider how data mining could generate higher anomaly returns on announcement days. We show that spurious anomaly strategies also have higher returns on news days and earnings announcement days. This finding means that previous studies that relate earnings announcements to anomaly returns do not address Fama's (1998) data-mining conjecture. We deal with Fama's

(1998) conjecture by developing a series of data-mining tests, which allow us to rule out the possibility that our results are entirely driven by data mining.

Finally, our study links the stock return anomaly literature to a literature on dynamic risk. To the best of our knowledge, this connection has not been made previously. As we mention above, the dynamic risk frameworks in Patton and Verado (2012) and Savor and Wilson (2016) can explain why stock returns are higher on earnings announcement days. These papers do not attempt to explain stock return anomalies, but our findings suggest that their frameworks could be useful to researchers that want to explain anomalies with risk.

1. Sample and Data

We begin our sample with 97 cross-sectional anomalies studied in McLean and Pontiff (2016). These anomalies are drawn from 80 studies published in peer-reviewed finance, accounting, and economics journals. Each of the anomaly variables has been reported to predict the cross-section of stock returns. All of the variables can be constructed with data from CRSP, Compustat, or IBES.

To create the anomaly portfolios, stocks are sorted each month on each of the anomaly characteristics. We define the extreme quintiles as the long and short side of each anomaly strategy. 16 of our 97 anomalies are indicator variables (e.g., credit rating downgrades). For these cases, there is only a long or short side, based on the binary value of the indicator. We remake the anomaly portfolios each month. As in McLean and Pontiff (2016), the sample selection for each anomaly follows the

original study. So, if a study only uses NYSE firms, then we only create that anomaly variable for NYSE firms.

We obtain earnings announcement dates from the Compustat quarterly database. Compustat reports the earnings announcement day, but not the time. Many firms report earnings after the market closes. In these cases, the information will be reflected in the stock return on the following day (CRSP returns are from close to close). We therefore examine the firm's trading volume scaled by market trading volume for the day before, the day of, and the day after the reported earnings announcement date. We define the day with the highest volume as the earnings announcement day.

We obtain news stories dates from the Dow Jones news archive. Dow Jones reports both the date and time of its news stories. This archive contains all news stories from Dow Jones newswire and all *Wall Street Journal* stories for the period 1979:06 to 2013. These news data are also used in Tetlock (2010, 2011) and Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012), who report the frequency news categories in the archive. Popular categories include mergers and acquisitions, earnings news and projections, analysts' comments and rankings, insider buying and selling, personnel appointments and dividend news.

We merge this news data and the earnings announcement data with daily stock return data, so we can test whether anomaly returns are higher on information days as compared to off information days. For consistency, we conduct all of our tests during the period 1979:06 to 2013, which is the period for which we have news data. We exclude stocks with prices under \$5. These low-priced stocks

are excluded from many of the anomaly portfolios to begin with, and low-priced stocks are less likely to have news or earnings announcement data.

1.1. Sample Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for our sample, which consists of 45,975,693 firm-day observations for the period 1979:06 to 2013. Each observation is in the CRSP daily return database with reported stock returns and a stock price greater than \$5 at the end of the previous trading day. Among these observations, 14.5% have Dow Jones news stories, while 1.1% have earnings announcements reported in Compustat.

There is overlap between the news days and the earnings announcement days. Of the 509,720 earnings announcement days, 235,444, or 46%, are also Dow Jones news days. This is, however, a small percentage of the total news days. The total number of news days is 6,629,300 so only 3.6% of these are also earnings announcements that are reported in Compustat. It could be that Dow Jones stories cover a significant number of earnings announcements not covered in Compustat, so 3.6% is a lower bound on the percentage of news stories that likely reflect earnings announcements.

Table 2 provides descriptive descriptions of the anomaly variables. Our primary anomaly variable is called *Net*. To construct *Net* for each firm-month observation we sum up the number of long-side (*Long*) and short-side (*Short*) anomaly portfolios that the observation belongs to. Recall that we form the long and short portfolios by placing stocks into quintiles based on monthly rankings of each

anomaly variable. *Net* is the difference between *Long* and *Short*: $Net = Long - Short$. Table 2 shows that the average stock is in 4.52 long portfolios and 5.52 short portfolios. If the portfolios were solely based on 97 random quintile groupings, we would expect long and short to both equal 19.4 (97 x 0.20). Our counts are lower since some characteristics are indicator variables. Thus, they lack either a long or short side. Also, following the original study, some variables are only constructed for a subset of stocks (for example, NYSE stocks). For anomaly variables that are subset based, stocks that fall out of the subset are not assigned to a long or short side. For more on the construction of the anomaly variables see the Internet Appendix of McLean and Pontiff (2016). The mean value for *Net* is -0.71, the maximum value is 33, and the minimum value is -38.

2. The Stylized Facts: Anomaly Returns on Information Days

2.1 Anomaly Returns On and Off Information Days

In this section of the paper we report our main findings. In our first set of tests, we estimate the following regression equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
 R_{i,t} = & \alpha_t + \beta_1 Net_{i,t} + \beta_2 Net_{i,t} \times Eday_{i,t} + \beta_3 Net_{i,t} \times Nday_{i,t} + \beta_4 Eday_{i,t} \\
 & + \beta_5 Nday_{i,t} + \sum_{j=1}^{10} \gamma_j Lag Return_{i,t-j} + \sum_{j=1}^{10} \delta_j Lag Return^2_{i,t-j} \\
 & + \sum_{j=1}^{10} \rho_j Volume_{i,t-j} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \tag{1}
 \end{aligned}$$

The regression includes day fixed effects (α_t). In the above equation, $R_{i,t}$ is the daily return of stock i on day t . $Net_{i,t}$ is our aggregate anomaly variable, which we

describe in more detail below. *Net* is measured at the beginning of each month and stock returns are measured on each day throughout the month. Thus, although news such as earnings announcements may affect future values of *Net* for a given stock, the value of *Net* that we use in our regressions remains the same throughout a month.

The variables *Eday* and *Nday* are dummy variables equal to 1 on earnings and news days for firm *i* and zero otherwise. Our hypotheses are tested with the interaction term: i.e., are anomaly returns higher on information days?

We include lagged values over the last 10 days for returns, volatility (return squared), and volume as controls. For brevity, we do not report these coefficients. Given the large number of observations used in most of our estimation, the inclusion of the 30 lagged values enables us to compare saturated and non-saturated regressions to assess the robustness of our results. We report specifications without these controls and the results are virtually identical. This comparison gives us more confidence in the robustness of our findings.

Table 3 reports the regression results. As mentioned above, returns are expressed in basis points. In Panel A, we define the information day as a 1-day window, while in Panel B we use a 3-day window, i.e., days $t-1$, t , and $t+1$. In order to facilitate interpretation we multiply returns by 10,000, so that each unit of return is equal to one basis point.

The first regression presents results that do not include the lagged volume, lagged return, and lagged squared return controls. Since our estimation uses millions of observations, omission and inclusion of correlated variables may cause

changes in statistical significance. A comparison of the first two regressions shows that this is not the case. Instead, the controls absorb variation, in that the standard errors in the second specification, which includes the lagged controls, shrink slightly, but the slope coefficients remain similar.

In the second regression in Panel A, the *Net* coefficient is 0.384, while the *Net x Earnings Announcement* interaction coefficient is 2.164. The coefficients show that for a *Net* value of 10 (about 1½ standard deviations) expected returns are higher by 3.84 basis points on non-earnings announcement days, and by an additional 21.64 basis points on earnings announcement days. Put differently, anomaly returns for a *Net* value of 10 are in total 25.48 on earnings announcement days, which is 6.3 times higher than anomaly returns on non-earnings announcement days.

The *Net x News Day* interaction coefficient is 0.178, showing that anomaly returns are about 50% higher on news days. For example, a stock with a *Net* value of 10 has an expected return that is 3.84 basis points higher on non-news days, compared with 5.62 basis points higher on news days.

In the third regression reported in Panel A, we replace the day-fixed effect with a day-information event fixed effect. This specification has four separate intercepts. That is, for a given day t , all firms with news share one intercept, all firms with earnings announcements share an intercept, all firms with both news and earnings announcements share an intercept, and all firms without news or earnings announcements share an intercept. In this regression, the comparison is between two firms that have the same information event on the same day, but have different values of *Net*. The coefficients in this regression are very similar to those in the

second regression. The *Net* coefficient is 0.363, while the earnings day and news day interactions are 2.127 and 0.300 respectively.

The results in Panel B, which study news and earnings announcement returns over 3-day windows, are similar. The information day coefficients are smaller as compared to Panel A, showing that most of the information is reflected in prices the day it is released. The news day interactions are still positive, but insignificant. Taken together with the results in Panel A, this result suggests that the effect of news on anomalies is reflected in prices almost fully on the day the information is released.

The coefficients reported in both panels document unconditionally higher returns on both earnings days and news days. The earnings day result is consistent with Franzini and Lamont (2006). We also stress here that our anomaly results and the results in Franzini and Lamont (2006) are completely different. We show that *anomaly returns* are elevated on information days, and we document this effect after controlling for the fact that regular stock returns are higher on earnings announcement days. Note also that our result is asymmetric (more on this below). For stocks with negative values of *Net*, anomaly returns are *lower* on earnings days.

2.2. Estimating Separate Long and Short Anomaly Effects

In Table 4, we remove the *Net* variable from the regressions and replace it with *High Net* and *Low Net* dummy variables. The dummies are based on quintiles constructed via daily sorts on *Net*. Using *High Net* and *Low Net* allows us to examine whether the effects of information are different for the long and short sides of

anomalies. We use the lagged controls described in the previous section in both of the regressions reported in Table 4 along with day fixed effects.

Relative to Table 3, which uses a continuous *Net* variable, the portfolio results in Table 4 are sharper. The first regression in Table 4 uses the 1-day announcement window. In this regression, the *High Net* coefficient is 0.018, while the *High Net x Earnings Announcement* interaction coefficient is 0.139, showing that long-side anomaly returns are 872% higher on earnings announcement days. The news day interaction is 0.031, showing that long-side anomaly returns are 272% higher on news days.

The effects on the short side are similar. The *Low Net* coefficient is -0.017, while the *Low Net x Earnings Announcement* interaction coefficient is -0.111, showing that short-side anomaly returns are 753% lower on earnings announcement days. The news day interaction is -0.041, showing that short-side anomaly returns are 341% lower on news days.

In column 2, we replace the 1-day window with a 3-day window for the news and earnings announcements. The results are similar. The magnitudes are smaller, which is to be expected with the longer window, however, the signs and significance of the coefficients are unchanged.

Figure 1 explores the dynamics of these effects before, on, and after an earnings announcement. We plot the coefficients from a regression of daily returns regressed on *High Net* and *Low Net* interacted with 3-day windows surrounding the earnings announcement. The figure clearly shows an asymmetric effect that does not reverse. That is, anomaly-shorts have lower abnormal returns during the 3-day

announcement window, while anomaly-longs have higher abnormal returns during the same period. Both sides have milder abnormal returns before and after the announcement. Hence, there is no reversal of the announcement effect; instead things seem to return back to “normal”.

2.3 Do the Effects vary Across Anomaly Types?

We now ask whether type of information used to create the anomaly affects the dynamics of its return around information days. Put differently, we ask whether the results in Tables 3 and 4 are robust across different types of anomalies, or are instead limited to certain types of anomalies. To categorize anomalies, we follow McLean and Pontiff (2016), who categorize anomalies into four different types: (i) Event; (ii) Market; (iii) Valuation; and (iv) Fundamentals. The categorization is based on the information needed to construct the anomaly.

Event anomalies are based on events within the firm, external events that affect the firm, and changes in firm performance. Examples of event anomalies include share issues, changes in financial analyst recommendations, and unexpected increases in R&D spending. Market anomalies are anomalies that can be constructed using only financial data, such as volume, prices, returns and shares outstanding. Momentum, long-term reversal, and market value of equity are included in our sample of market anomalies.

Valuation anomalies are ratios, where one of the numbers reflects a market value and the other reflects fundamentals. Examples of valuation anomalies include sales-to-price and market-to-book. Finally, fundamental anomalies are those that

are constructed with financial statement data and nothing else. Leverage, taxes, and accruals are fundamental anomalies.

We construct the same *Net* variable as before, only we sum up the portfolio memberships within each of the four groups. As in the previous tables, the regressions include time fixed effects, the lagged control variables used in the previous tables, and standard errors clustered on time.

In Table 5 we report a separate regression for each anomaly type. The results show that the earnings day and news day effects documented in the earlier tables are pervasive. *Event*, *Market*, and *Valuation* anomalies all perform better on earnings days and news days. *Fundamental* anomalies are much stronger on earnings days, but weaker on news days. As we explain above, *Fundamental* anomalies are made solely with accounting information, so this may explain why they are so affected by earnings.

With respect to the earnings day interactions, all of the anomaly-long portfolios have positive interactions, and 3 of the 4 anomaly-short portfolios have negative earnings day interactions. The exception is the short-side *Market* anomaly portfolio, which has a positive earnings day interaction. *Market* anomalies are made only with market data, and no accounting data, so this may explain why they are more affected by news than earnings announcements.

With respect to the news day interactions, on the short-side all of the anomaly groups have negative and significant interactions, with the exception of *Fundamental* anomalies, which has a positive, marginally significant, interaction. On the long-side, *Market* anomalies have a positive and significant interaction, the

Valuation and *Event* interactions are insignificant, while *Fundamental* anomalies have a negative and significant interaction. Overall, the results show that all types of anomalies are stronger on news days and earnings days, with some differences that seem to be related to the information used to construct the anomaly variable.

2.4 Firm-Specific News or a Different Explanation?

In this section, we try to better understand whether higher anomaly returns on information days reflect a reaction to firm specific news, or instead can be explained by some other effect. Specifically, we ask whether day-of-the-week effects, macroeconomic news announcements, or reverse-causality (perhaps extreme returns cause news) can explain why anomaly returns are higher on information days.

Day of the Week Effects. Birru (2016) finds that anomalies for which the long-leg is the speculative leg perform better on Fridays, and anomalies for which the short-leg is the speculative leg perform better on Mondays. Birru (2016) argues that these patterns are consistent with studies in the psychology literature, which show that mood increases from Thursday to Friday and decreases on Monday.

In order to test whether such day of the week effects influence our results we estimate a specification where we interact the *High Net* and *Low Net* anomaly variables with Monday and Friday dummy variables and the news day and earnings day dummy variables. We report these results in the first column of Table 6. The results show that including the Monday and Friday interactions have virtually no effect on the earnings day and news day interactions, as the coefficients reported in

column 1 of Table 6 are very similar to those reported in column 1 of Table 4, which is the same regression, but excluding the Monday and Friday interactions.

We do not classify our anomalies into speculative and non-speculative legs like Birru (2016) does, so our results may not be directly comparable to his, however we do find evidence of day of the week effects with our anomaly variables. Both *High Net* and *Low Net* perform better on Mondays, and both perform worse on Friday, although the Friday effects are not significant. The Monday effect is quite strong; anomaly returns are more than twice as strong on Monday as compared to other days of week. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been shown in the literature previously. One explanation for the Monday effect is that there is more information impounded into prices on Monday. News is released over the weekend, however investors cannot trade until Monday. Hence, Monday itself can be thought of as a type of “news day” indicator. These results are therefore consistent with the other findings in our paper, i.e., anomalies perform better on days in which new information gets incorporated into prices.

Macroeconomic News. Savor and Wilson (2013) find that market returns are higher on days for which macroeconomic news about inflation, unemployment, or interest rates is scheduled for announcement. They argue that their results reflect compensation for higher risk that is associated with such announcements. It could be the case that investors infer macroeconomic news from earnings announcements and corporate news stories, and that this in turn explains why anomaly returns are higher on information days.

In order to control for the effects of macroeconomic news we estimate a

specification that interacts the *High Net* and *Low Net* anomaly variables with a macro news dummy. The macro news dummy is the same variable that is used in Savor and Wilson (2013). The macro news dummy is equal 1 if there is a scheduled announcement regarding inflation, employment, or interest rates, and zero otherwise. We report the results from this specification in the second column in Table 6. The results show that the inclusion of the macroeconomic news interactions has virtually no effect on the earnings day and news day interactions. The results also show that anomaly portfolios perform significantly worse on macroeconomic news days. The long-side returns are half as large on macro news days, and short-side returns are actually positive, i.e., short positions have negative alphas on macro news days. These findings do not support the idea that anomaly returns are higher on days with earnings announcements and corporate news because investors infer macroeconomic news from these firm-specific information events.

Reverse Causality. It could be the case that extreme returns cause news stories. If this is the case, then the anomaly-news day interactions we document might not reflect news being impounded into asset prices, but instead reflect news stories being written about high and low stock returns. This effect cannot explain our anomaly-earnings announcement interactions (stock returns do not cause firms to report earnings), which are significantly larger than the news day interactions. Nonetheless, we address the possibility that this framework can explain our news day interactions by interacting *High Net* and *Low Net* with the contemporaneous daily stock return squared. The slope on the interaction measures whether *High Net*

and *Low Net* perform differently on extreme return days.

We report the results from this test in the third column of Table 6. The results show that including the extreme return interactions has almost no effect on our news day and earnings day interactions. The one exception is that anomaly-shorts perform better on news days and earnings days if the extreme return interactions are included. Anomaly-shorts also perform worse on extreme return days, whereas anomaly-longs are unaffected. The results here do not support the idea that anomaly returns are higher on information days because news stories are being written about extreme returns.

3. Risk as an Explanation for the Anomaly-News Findings

In this section, we examine whether risk-based frameworks can explain why anomaly returns are higher on earnings days and news days.

3.1. A Dynamic-Risk and Mispricing Framework

Consider the expected return of a stock that is on the long side of a portfolio based on our *Net* variable. Assume that the returns associated with *Net* can be entirely explained by exposure to systematic risk. In the typical, static-factor model we could write the expected return for such a stock as:

$$E(r_{i,t}) = r_f + \text{Beta}_i * E(\text{RiskPremium}) \quad (2)$$

Could such a framework explain the stylized facts presented in the paper so far? Recall that table 3 shows that *Net* predicts higher returns, and that this return-predictability is elevated on earnings announcement days. Note that in Equation 2,

beta and the expected value of the risk premium are both time invariant, so this static framework cannot explain our findings.

We can alter Equation (2) by letting beta and the expected value of the risk premium time vary, which is what we do in Equation (3):

$$E(r_{i,t}) = r_f + \text{Beta}_{i,t} * E(\text{RiskPremium}_t) \quad (3)$$

In Equation (3) both the risk premium and individual firm betas can vary over time. This might explain our findings if either (i) risk premiums increase on information days or, (ii) beta changes on information days. If high (low) *Net* stocks have high (low) betas, than an increase in the risk premium on information days would result in an increase in the return spread between high and low *Net* stocks. Alternatively, it could be that when information is released beta increases for high *Net* stocks and decreases (or increases much less) for low *Net* stocks. If investors expect this and know of the announcement date ahead of time, then it could also account for the elevated spread between high and low *Net* stocks on information days.

In Table 7 we test whether dynamic risk premiums or dynamic betas can explain why anomaly returns are higher on information days. The previous tables show that the effects are more salient on earnings days than on news days, so to keep our specifications parsimonious we only include earnings days in these tests.

As we explain above, one reason that anomaly returns could be higher on earnings days is that risk premiums are elevated on earnings days, and high (low) *Net* stocks have high (low) betas, so a spike in risk premiums leads to a widening in return differentials between high and low *Net* stocks. To address this, in regression 1, we regress daily stock returns on the *High Net* and *Low Net* dummies, an earnings

day dummy, interactions between the earnings day dummy and the high and low *Net* dummies, and day fixed effects. The day fixed effects mean that our coefficients reflect differences in expected returns *across stocks on the same day*.

In regression 1, the *High Net* and *High Net x Earnings Day* coefficients are both positive and significant, whereas the *Low Net* and *Low Net x Earnings Day* coefficients are both negative and significant. The coefficients show that if there are two high *Net* stocks on day t , and one has an earnings announcement and the other does not, then the stocks with the earnings announcement has a return that is almost 10 times higher. Similarly, if there are two low *Net* stocks on day t , and one has an earnings announcement and the other does not, the stock with the earnings announcement has a return that is about 5 times lower. These results clearly cannot be caused by a daily change in risk premiums, as we are comparing returns *across stocks with the same beta (Net) on the same day*.

Regression 2 takes things a step further. It includes *Day x Hi Net* and *Day x Low Net* fixed effects. What this means is that on each day t , high *Net* stocks have their own intercept, low *Net* stocks have their own intercept, and the rest of the stocks have their own intercept. In this specification as well, the *High Net x Earnings Day* coefficient is positive and significant, and the *Low Net x Earnings Day* coefficient is negative and significant. What this means is that, if we compare two high *Net* stocks on day t , the one with the earnings announcement has the higher return, and if we compare two low *Net* stocks on an earnings day, the one with the earnings announcement has a lower return, even after accounting for the average return in each group on each day (via the fixed effect). These results again contradict the idea

that anomaly returns are higher on earnings days because risk premiums are higher, as the fixed effects absorb any changes in the risk premium. To summarize, we take stocks with the same level of *Net* (high or low) and show that there are large differences *across these stocks on the same day* due to earnings announcements.

In the next few regressions, we consider the idea that betas can change on earnings announcement days. We add either a market portfolio factor (*Market*) or an anomaly factor (*Factor*) to our regressions, and interact each with the information day dummies. *Market* is the daily return of the CRSP value-weighted index, while *Factor* is the daily return for a portfolio that is long in stocks ranked in top 20% percentile of *Net*, and short in stocks ranked in the bottom 20% percentile of *Net*. The coefficients for *Factor* and *Market* reflect the average stock's beta with respect to each portfolio.

Following Shanken (1990), interactions are used to consider both time-series and cross-sectional variations in beta. In regression 3, we include interactions between each of the *Net* variables and *Market*, and then 3-way interactions that include each of the *Net* variables, *Market*, and the earnings day dummy. In regression 4 we perform a similar regression, but replace *Market* with *Factor*. We include day fixed effects in both regressions, so for this reason coefficients for *Market* and *Factor* are not estimated.

In regression 3, we see that, when compared to regression 1, the coefficients for *High Net* and *Low Net* and the coefficients for the earnings day interactions are virtually the same. Hence, controlling for market beta and the fact that market beta can be elevated on earnings days does not seem to explain our findings. We also see

that the coefficient for *High Net x Market* is negative, whereas the coefficient for *Low Net x Market* is positive. What this shows is that high *Net* stocks have *lower* market betas than low *Net* stocks do, i.e., *Net* produces a portfolio that has a *negative* beta.. This finding is consistent with several earlier studies, which also show that stocks on the long (short) side of anomaly portfolios have higher (lower) betas.³ The results further show that for both high and low *Net* stocks, betas are not significantly higher on earnings announcement days. The *Earnings Day x Market* coefficient is positive and significant showing that on average, among all stocks, betas are higher on earnings days, consistent with Patton and Verado (2012) and Savor and Wilson (2016), however this effect is not different for high or low *Net* stocks. Overall, the results in regression 3 do not support the idea that elevated market betas can explain why anomaly returns are higher on earnings days.

Regression 4 is like regression 3, only it replaces *Market* with *Factor*, which is a portfolio that is long in high *Net* stocks and short in low *Net* stocks. Here again, we see that as compared to regression 1, the coefficients for *High Net* and *Low Net* and the coefficients for the earnings day interactions are virtually the same. Hence, controlling for beta with respect to *Factor* and the fact that *Factor* can change on earnings days does not seem to explain why anomaly returns are higher on earnings days. We also see that the interaction between *Factor* and the earnings day dummy is negative and significant. What this means is that if a stock has an earnings

³ Examples include: high book-to-market and high earnings-to-price stocks have low betas (Fama and French, 1992), high momentum stocks have low betas (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), high idiosyncratic stocks earn lower returns despite the fact that they have higher betas (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang, 2006), and firms that repurchase shares experience positive abnormal returns and reductions in betas (Grullon and Michaely, 2004).

announcement its covariance with *Factor* is lower.

Regression 4 further shows that the interaction between *High Net* and *Factor* is positive and significant (this is partly mechanical), as is the 3-way interaction between *High Net*, *Factor*, and the earnings day dummy. Similarly, we see that the interaction between *Low Net* and *Factor* is negative and significant (this is also partly mechanical), as is the 3-way interaction between *Low Net*, *Factor*, and the earnings day dummy. So there is evidence that beta with respect to *Factor* is higher (lower) for high (low) *Net* stocks, and that this effect is stronger on earnings days. However, even after controlling for all of this, it is still the case that high (low) *Net* stocks have higher (lower) returns and that this effect is stronger in earnings days. So beta with respect to *Factor* cannot fully account for our findings, but it could be the case that if we had the “right” factor that beta would account for our findings.

What the results in Table 7 show overall is that there is some evidence that factor betas are elevated on earnings days, and that if a risk-based model were to explain anomaly returns it would need to have this feature. Hence, static models, and models that only allow for risk premiums to time vary will likely not be able to explain anomaly returns. Instead, a risk-based model will need to explicitly allow for dynamic betas that change dramatically when firm-specific information is released if it is going to explain stock return anomalies.

4. Biased Expectations

In this section of the paper we take a closer look at the idea that biased expectations can explain why anomaly returns are higher on information days. In

the biased expectations framework, investors are too optimistic about some stocks and too pessimistic about others, and the anomaly variables reflect these biases. As an example, stocks with high past sales growth have low stock returns (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)). A possible reason for this is that investors naively extrapolate past sales growth into the future, whereas in reality there is a good deal of mean reversion. Hence, high sales growth firms subsequently report lower sales and earnings than investors expect, resulting in low stock returns on days that this information is released.

Models of stock return anomalies that are based on biased expectations include Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001). In these models long-term reversal and price-to-fundamental anomalies are caused by biased expectations about future cash flows and a price correction that occurs when new information is made public. Here we ask whether the ideas on these papers can be extended to explain anomalies in general.

To further study the role of biased expectations in a setting that cannot be affected by risk (static or dynamic) we consider analyst earnings forecast errors.⁴ There is no framework that we know of linking risk, especially dynamic risk, to analyst forecast errors, which reflect mistakes on the part of sell-side analysts. The results in the paper thus far show that when new information is released, anomaly-longs have higher returns and anomaly-shorts have lower returns. If biased

⁴ Analyst forecast errors are particularly useful as a proxy for expected cashflows. Analysts also generate recommendations and price targets. Engelberg, McLean, and Pontiff (2017) study the extent to which information from anomaly variables is reflected in analyst enthusiasm for a stock.

expectations explain these effects, and if analysts' earnings forecasts are correlated with the expectations of investors, then analysts' earnings forecasts should be too low (high) for stocks on the long (short) side of anomaly portfolios.

Our analyst earnings forecast error variable is a summary variable constructed with data from IBES. It is the difference between a stock's last reported median sell-side forecast and the actual reported earnings (per IBES), divided by the closing stock price in the previous month.

$$Forecast\ Error_t = \frac{Earnings\ Forecast_t - Actual\ Earnings_t}{Price_{t-1}}$$

This variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The biased expectations framework predicts that this variable will be negative for the long-side stocks (forecast too low) and positive for the short-side stocks (forecast too high). We have data from IBES for the period 1983 through 2014. We merge the forecast data with our anomaly data and test whether anomaly portfolio membership can predict forecast error.

We control for the number of analysts making earnings forecasts, whether there is only a single forecast, and the standard deviation of the forecast scaled by stock price. If there is only a single forecast, we set the standard deviation of the forecast equal to zero.

We report the results from these tests in Table 8. We multiply the forecast error variable by 100 so that the coefficients are easier to read. The first regression reports the findings for the full 97-anomaly samples. The regression coefficients show that analyst forecasts are too high for stocks in the short side of anomaly

portfolios and too low for stocks in the long side of anomaly portfolios. Both of these effects are statistically significant.

The effects are economically significant too. The regression intercept is 0.028, and the regression coefficients show that the effect of being in the *High Net* portfolio is a forecast error that is lower by -0.045, and that the effect of being in the *Low Net* portfolio is a forecast error that is higher by 0.017. These are large effects that support the idea that earnings forecast surprises have sizeable effects on anomaly returns on earnings announcement days.

Table 8 also reports the effects across the 4 anomaly groups. We see that in all four groups, the *High Net* variable is negative and significant for three groups, while the *Low Net* variable it is positive and significant for three of the anomaly groups. The exception in both cases is the *Market* anomalies, which have the opposite result. As we explain earlier, market anomalies include variables that are constructed only with market data, and include momentum, reversal and idiosyncratic risk. With *Market* anomalies, analyst forecasts are too high for the longs and too low for the shorts. The evidence here is consistent with the evidence in Table 5, which shows that *Market* anomalies perform better on news days, but not earnings days.

Taken in their entirety, the results in Table 8 largely agree with the results in the other tables. Investors and analysts seem to be too pessimistic (optimistic) about the future earnings stocks in the long (short) side of anomaly portfolios. This bias is revealed in stock returns when firms announce earnings and other news. This result is consistent with the biased expectations explanation for anomaly

returns, but not risk. However, as we explain below, these results may not contradict data-mining as an explanation for anomaly returns, so further tests are needed before concluding that biased expectations are playing a role in creating anomaly returns.

5. Data Mining

Fama (1998), McLean and Pontiff (2016), and Harvey, Lin, and Zhu (2016), stress that data mining could explain a good deal of cross-sectional return predictability. In our sample, earnings day returns have a return standard deviation that is twice that of non-information days, and Dow Jones news days have a return standard deviation that is 30% greater than non-information days. Given that returns are so much more volatile on information days, an anomaly that is the result of data mining would likely perform especially well on information days. Therefore we conduct several different tests of the hypothesis that the information day effects documented in this paper can be explained by data mining.

Data-Mined Strategies and Information Day Returns. We first examine whether a data-mined strategy performs especially well on information days. We test whether any firm with a high (low) return on month t , regardless of it being in an anomaly portfolio, would also have high (low) information day returns in month t . We estimate the following regression equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
R_{i,t} = & \alpha_t + \beta_1 Monthly_{i,t} + \beta_2 Monthly_{i,t} \times Eday_{i,t} + \beta_3 Monthly_{i,t} \times Nday_{i,t} \\
& + \beta_4 Eday_{i,t} + \beta_5 Nday_{i,t} + \sum_{j=1}^{10} \gamma_j Lag Return_{i,t-j} \\
& + \sum_{j=1}^{10} \delta_j Lag Return^2_{i,t-j} + \sum_{j=1}^{10} \rho_j Volume_{i,t-j} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (4)
\end{aligned}$$

The above equation is essentially the same as equation (1), only we replace *Net* with *Monthly*, which is the contemporaneous monthly stock return. The dependent variable is the daily stock return. The coefficient for *Monthly* will be positive and significant, i.e., firms with higher stock returns in a month also have higher stock returns during the days of that month. The interactions test whether, after controlling for the effects of *Monthly*, stocks with high (low) monthly stock returns also have especially (high) low information day returns during that month.

The results for our estimation of Equation (4) are reported in the first column of Table 9. The results show that it is the case that when monthly returns are high (low) information day returns during that month are especially high (low). The coefficient for *Monthly* is 5.225, showing that a firm with a stock return of 10% in a given month has an expected daily return of 0.5225% during that month. If the day has an earnings announcement, the expected return increases by a factor of 11.6. If the day has a Dow Jones news story, the expected return increases by a factor of 2.3. Hence, a data-mined strategy would also have extreme returns on information days.

In column 2 of Table 9 we add *Net* and the interactions between *Net* and the

earnings day and news day dummies along with *Monthly* and its interactions. The *Net* coefficient is negative and significant in this regression. Thus, after controlling for monthly returns, high *Net* stocks have *lower expected returns on non-information days*. This means that if we have two stocks with same return in month t , *the anomaly stock earns more of its return on information days*. This does not support the idea that anomaly returns are caused by data mining. If anomaly returns reflect data mining, then we would expect the same daily return patterns between anomaly stocks and non-anomaly stocks with the same monthly return.

The *Net* interactions with both the earnings and news day dummies are positive and significant, showing that even after controlling for the effects of *Monthly*, anomalies still perform especially well on information days. This contradicts the idea that anomalies can be explained by data mining alone.

This data-mining test also contradicts the idea that extreme stock returns cause news, which we discussed earlier in the paper. If extreme returns cause news, then this should be the case for both anomaly firms and non-anomaly firms. Yet we find the effect of news on stock returns is stronger for anomaly firms, even after controlling for the level of monthly returns.

Critically, our test does not estimate the portion of anomaly returns which come from data mining; rather, it estimates the incremental return that data mining cannot explain. For example, suppose a student may have been given a “cheat sheet” for an exam so that if he followed it he would get a 75 on the exam. If we observe him getting a 95 on the exam, we can reject the hypothesis that his exam score was purely do to cheating. We also cannot attribute the points due to

cheating. He may have scored a 95 entirely on his own merit or he may have used the “cheat sheet” for 75 of the points. Similarly, our tests in Table 9 allow us to reject the null of pure data mining, but we cannot say what portion, if any, of our result comes from data mining.

Firm Size. A number of studies show that anomalies tend to be stronger in small firms, illiquid firms, and firms with high idiosyncratic risk (see Pontiff (1996, 2006)). We can think of no reason why spurious anomalies should be stronger in small firms. We therefore split our sample into small and large firms, where large (small) stocks are those above (below) the median market capitalization on day t , and estimate Equation (1) within each sample. In these specifications we continue to control for the *Monthly* stock return, and therefore compare the coefficients to those reported in column 2.

We report these size-partitioned results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 9. The *Net* coefficient is insignificant in both specifications, showing that, within size groups, after we control for monthly, return, the daily return of a high or low *Net* stock is not different on a non-information day. In column 4, which reports the results for small stocks, the *Net* earnings day interaction is 0.715, while the *Net* earnings day interaction is 3.067 in column 5 for the small stocks, or 4 times higher. Similarly, the news day interaction is insignificant among large stocks, but positive and significant among the small stocks. These results also show is that virtually all of the difference in anomaly returns between large and small stocks occurs on information days. Data mining does not predict such dramatic differences between large and small stocks, but mispricing theories, which require limits to arbitrage, do.

For example, Pontiff (1996, 2006), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Pedersen (2015) all argue that the size of the market inefficiency should be related to the cost of correcting that inefficiency. Given that arbitrage costs are greater among small stocks, under the mispricing theory of anomaly returns we expect news to lead to larger corrections of mispricing for small stocks because there is more mispricing to correct.

Out-of-Sample Predictability. An alternative way to get at the data-mining question is to only study anomalies after the sample period from the study that first documented the anomaly. We therefore build an anomaly variable, “Out of Sample” (*OOS*), which is constructed similarly to *Net*, except *OOS* only uses anomalies in months after end date of the original sample. As an example, the sample period for the accrual anomaly (Sloan, 1996) is 1962-1991. With *OOS*, we begin to use the accrual anomaly in 1992, whereas with *Net* we use begin using accruals in 1979 (the first year for which we have news data).

We report the results for *OOS* in column 5 of Table 9. This specification is like the specification defined in Equation (1), only *OOS* replaces *Net*. The results for *OOS* are similar to those with *Net*. Using *OOS*, we estimate that anomaly returns are almost 5.6 times higher on earnings announcement days, and 50% higher on Dow Jones News days. As a comparison, in regression 3 in Table 3 we see that news day and earnings day effects are virtually the same.

5.1. Data Mining and Analyst Forecast Errors

The results in Table 8 show that analysts’ earnings forecasts are too low for

anomaly-longs and too high for anomaly-shorts, which is consistent with the idea that biased expectations are what create anomaly returns. Yet this finding is also consistent with data mining as an explanation for anomaly returns. A spurious anomaly is likely just by chance to be long in stocks that had positive earnings surprises and short stocks that have negative earnings surprises. It would be difficult to generate abnormal returns otherwise.

To further explore this idea, we re-estimate the analyst forecast error regression reported in column 1 of Table 8, but use *Monthly* in place of *High Net* and *Low Net*. These results are reported in column 1 of Table 10. The coefficient for *Monthly* is negative and significant, showing that analyst forecasts were too low for stocks with high returns, and too high for stocks with low returns. These findings suggest that virtually any variable that predicts returns *in-sample*, be it spurious or authentic, would most likely also predict analysts' forecast error.

To control for this data-mining effect, we estimate a specification that includes *Monthly* along with *High Net* and *Low Net*. The results for this specification are reported in column 2 of Table 10. As in column 1, *Monthly* is negative and significant, however *High Net* is also negative and significant, and *Low Net* is positive and significant. These results are inconsistent with the idea that data explains earnings forecast error predictability by anomaly variables.

We further explore the possibility of data mining by replacing *High Net* and *Low Net* with *High OOS* and *Low OOS*. The *OOS* variables are constructed entirely with anomalies that are out-of-sample, which makes it unlikely that results with the *OOS* variables can be explained by data mining. We report these results in column 5

of Table 10. The coefficient for *High OOS* is negative and significant, and the coefficient for *Low OOS* is positive and significant. Hence, even out-of-sample anomaly variables can predict analysts' forecast errors. This finding is difficult to reconcile with risk or data mining, but is fully consistent with mispricing.

6. Conclusions

Evidence of cross-sectional return-predictability goes back more than four decades, yet to this day academics disagree about the cause. In this paper, we compare return predictability on news and non-news days, and find that anomaly returns are elevated on news days. We document this using a sample of 97 anomalies. This finding is robust across different types of anomalies, it is not explained by day-of-the-week effects, nor is it explained by anomalies simply being greater on high volatility days. The results likely reflect firm-specific news, as anomaly returns are not higher on days when macroeconomic news is announced.

Although earlier studies conclude that higher anomaly returns on earnings days reflect mispricing, we show that this need not be the case. Such results could also reflect a dynamic risk or data mining. We show that anomaly betas are elevated on earnings announcement days, so future studies should consider this feature. That being said, our finding of higher anomaly returns on earnings days is not affected by the inclusion of dynamic betas. With respect to data mining, out-of-sample anomalies, which are likely not explained by data mining, exhibit higher returns on earnings days and news days, and predict analyst forecast error, so it is unlikely that data mining can explain our findings.

Our findings are most consistent with the idea that investors have overly optimistic expectations about the cash flows of some firms and overly pessimistic expectations about the cash flows of other firms. When new information is released, investors revise their biased beliefs, which, in turn, cause prices to change, which, in turn, causes the observed return predictability. Evidence from sell-side equity earnings forecasts dovetail with the stock return evidence: analysts overestimate the earnings for firms on the short-side of anomaly portfolios and underestimate earnings for firms on the long-side.

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Figure 1: Anomaly Returns around Earnings Announcement Days

This figure reports the coefficients from regressions of daily returns on the *High Net* and *Low Net* dummy variables, dummies for 3-day windows around earnings announcements, interactions between *High Net* and *Low Net* and the 3-day window dummies, and day fixed effects. Returns are expressed in basis points. *High Net* and *Low Net* are defined in Table 2. The Figure plots the sum of the coefficients for the interactions and the coefficients for *High Net* and *Low Net*, i.e., we plot the overall effect of *High Net* and *Low Net* for each of the seven different 3-day windows.




Table 1: Earnings Announcement and News Data

This table describes our sample in terms of earnings announcements and news releases. The unit of observation is at the firm-day level. To be included in our sample, a stock must have a daily stock return, and a stock price that is at least \$5 as of yesterday's close. We obtain earnings announcement dates from the Compustat quarterly database, and news announcements from the Dow Jones news archive. If the announcement is made after hours then the following trading day is the event day. The sample period is from 1979-2013.

Number of Firm-Day Returns			
	News Day		Total
Earnings Day	No	Yes	
No	38,679,894	6,393,856	45,073,750
Yes	274,276	235,444	509,720
Total	38,954,170	6,629,300	45,583,470

Percentage of Firm-Day Returns			
	News Day		Total
Earnings Day	No	Yes	
No	84.9%	14.0%	98.9%
Yes	0.6%	0.5%	1.1%
Total	85.5%	14.5%	100%

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Portfolio Variables

This table provides descriptive statistics for the anomaly variables used in this study. We use the 97 cross-sectional anomalies studied in McLean and Pontiff (2016). Each month, stocks are sorted on each anomaly characteristic (e.g., size, book-to-market, accruals, etc.). We use the extreme quintiles to define the long-side and short-side of each anomaly strategy. 16 of our 97 anomalies are indicator variables (e.g., credit rating downgrades). For these anomalies, there is only a long or short side, based on the binary value of the indicator. For each firm-day observation, we sum up the number of long-side and short-side anomaly portfolios that the firm belongs to; this creates the variables *Long* and *Short*. The variable *Net* is equal to *Long-Short*.

Variable	Observations	Aggregate Anomaly Variables					
		Mean	Std. Dev.	25th %ile	75th%ile	Min	Max
<i>Long</i>	45,583,470	4.52	4.46	1	7	0	37
<i>Short</i>	45,583,470	5.52	4.78	2	8	0	45
<i>Net</i>	45,583,470	-0.71	4.19	-3	1	-38	33

Table 3: Anomaly Returns on Earnings Days and News Days

This table reports results from a regression of daily returns on time-fixed effects, the *Net* anomaly variable, earnings day and news day dummy variables, interactions between the *Net* and the information-day variables, and control variables (coefficients unreported). Daily return, the dependent variable, is expressed in basis points. The control variables include lagged values for each of the past 10 days for stock returns, stock returns squared, and trading volume. To create the *Net* anomaly variable we use the 97 cross-sectional anomalies studied in McLean and Pontiff (2016). For each stock-month observation, we sum up the number of long-side and short-side anomaly portfolios that the stock belongs to, thereby creating *Long* and *Short*. *Net* is equal to *Long* minus *Short*. We then merge this monthly dataset with daily stock return data from CRSP and with daily indicators for earnings announcement days and Dow Jones News stories, which we refer to as information days. We define an earnings day (*Eday*) or news day (*Nday*) as the 1-day or 3-day window around an earnings announcement or news release, i.e., days $t-1$, t , and $t+1$. The standard errors are clustered on time. The sample period is from 1979:6 to 2013:12.

Table 3: (Continued)

	Panel A: 1-Day Window			Panel B: 3-Day Window		
<i>Net</i>	0.367 (5.77)***	0.384 (6.06)***	0.363 (5.69)***	0.387 (6.02)***	0.408 (6.35)***	0.385 (6.03)***
<i>Net * Eday</i>	2.098 (8.32)***	2.164 (8.54)***	2.127 (8.43)***	1.051 (7.86)***	1.115 (8.25)***	1.083 (7.14)***
<i>Net * Nday</i>	0.170 (2.92)***	0.178 (3.04)***	0.300 (3.08)***	0.038 (0.71)	0.042 (0.78)	0.120 (1.30)
<i>Eday</i>	0.084 (8.24)***	0.090 (8.71)***		0.034 (6.48)***	0.040 (7.48)***	
<i>Nday</i>	0.117 (17.48)***	0.124 (19.06)***		0.081 (14.65)***	0.087 (16.18)***	
<i>Lagged Controls? Fixed Effects?</i>	No Day	Yes Day	Yes Day * Event	No Day	Yes Day	Yes Day * Event

Table 4: Long and Short Anomaly Returns on Earnings Days and News Days

This table reports results from a regression of daily returns on the *High Net* and *Low Net* dummy variables, information day dummy variables, interactions between *High Net* and *Low Net* and the information day variables, control variables (coefficients unreported), and time fixed effects. Daily return, the dependent variable, is expressed in basis points. The controls include lagged values for each of the past 10 days for stock returns, stock returns squared, and trading volume. To create the *High Net* and *Low Net* anomaly variable we use the 97 cross-sectional anomalies studied in McLean and Pontiff (2016). We sort firms each month on our aggregate anomaly variable, *Net*, and place them into high and low quintiles. We then merge this monthly dataset with daily stock return data from CRSP and with daily indicators for earnings announcement days and Dow Jones News stories, which we refer to as information days. We define an earnings day (Eday) or news day (Nday) as the 1-day or 3-day window around an earnings announcement or news release, i.e., days $t-1$, t , and $t+1$. The sample period is from 1979:6 to 2013:12. The standard errors are clustered on time.

Table 4 (Continued)

	1-Day Window	3-Day Window
<i>High Net</i>	0.018 (6.79)***	0.016 (6.62)***
<i>Low Net</i>	-0.017 (3.91)***	-0.016 (3.88)***
<i>High Net * Eday</i>	0.139 (6.22)***	0.086 (8.14)***
<i>Low Net * Eday</i>	-0.111 (4.96)***	-0.052 (4.56)***
<i>High Net * Nday</i>	0.031 (5.51)	0.017 (3.70)
<i>Low Net * Nday</i>	-0.041 (6.81)***	-0.028 (5.30)***
<i>Eday</i>	0.068 (5.51)***	0.024 (3.89)***
<i>Nday</i>	0.126 (19.80)***	0.029 (17.42)***
<i>Day Fixed Effects?</i>	Yes	Yes

Table 5: The Effect of Information Across Anomaly Types

This table tests whether the effect of information on daily anomaly returns varies across different types of anomalies. To conduct this exercise, we split our anomalies into the four groups created in McLean and Pontiff (2016): (i) Event; (ii) Market; (iii) Valuation; and (iv) Fundamentals. Event anomalies are those based on corporate events or changes in performance. Examples of event anomalies are share issues, changes in financial analyst recommendations, and unexpected increases in R&D spending. Market anomalies are anomalies that can be constructed using only financial data, such as volume, prices, returns and shares outstanding. Momentum, long-term reversal, and market value of equity (size) are included in our sample of market anomalies. Valuation anomalies are ratios, where one of the numbers reflects a market value and the other reflects fundamentals. Examples of valuation anomalies include sales-to-price and market-to-book. Fundamental anomalies are those that are constructed with financial statement data and nothing else. Leverage, taxes, and accruals are fundamental anomalies. The regressions include time fixed effects and controls for lagged values for each of the past 10 days for stock returns, stock returns squared, and trading volume (coefficients unreported). The dependent variable, daily stock return, is expressed in basis points. The sample period is from 1979:6 to 2013:12. The standard errors are clustered on time.

	<i>Market</i>	<i>Valuation</i>	<i>Fundamental</i>	<i>Event</i>
<i>High Net</i>	0.000 (0.02)	0.008 (3.26)***	0.009 (3.61)***	0.013 (5.69)***
<i>Low Net</i>	-0.005 (1.31)	-0.021 (4.76)***	-0.021 (5.51)***	-0.015 (4.83)***
<i>High Net * Eday</i>	0.078 (3.17)***	0.121 (5.98)***	0.028 (1.36)	0.105 (4.81)***
<i>Low Net * Eday</i>	0.052 (2.59)***	-0.118 (4.85)***	-0.140 (6.05)***	-0.082 (3.80)***
<i>High Net * Nday</i>	0.085 (12.38)***	-0.000 (0.03)	-0.013 (2.90)***	-0.001 (0.12)
<i>Low Net * Nday</i>	-0.059 (10.31)***	-0.013 (2.09)**	0.010 (1.75)*	-0.020 (3.95)***
<i>Eday</i>	0.039 (3.17)***	0.067 (5.41)***	0.068 (5.33)***	0.098 (7.55)***
<i>Nday</i>	0.124 (18.85)***	0.124 (19.03)***	0.123 (19.32)***	0.120 (18.64)***
<i>Day Fixed Effects?</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 6: Do the Results Reflect Firm-Specific Information?

This table reports results from a regression of daily returns on time fixed effects, the *High Net* and *Low Net* anomaly variables, an information day dummy variable, interactions between the *High Net* and *Low Net* and the information day variables, and control variables (coefficients unreported). The dependent variable, daily stock return, is expressed in basis points. The controls include lagged values for each of the past 10 days for stock returns, stock returns squared, and trading volume. To create the *High Net* and *Low Net* anomaly variables we use the 97 cross-sectional anomalies studied in McLean and Pontiff (2016). We sort firms each month on our aggregate anomaly variable, *Net*, and place them into high and low quintiles. We define an earnings day (Eday) or news day (Nday) as the 1-day window around an earnings announcement or news release. In regression 1 we include interactions between *High Net* and *Low Net* and Monday (*Mon*) and Friday (*Fri*). In regression 2 we interact *High Net* and *Low Net* with a macro announcement dummy (*Mac*). Following Savor and Wilson (2013, 2016) *Mac* is equal to 1 if there is a news announcement regarding inflation, unemployment, or interest rates. The sample period is from 1979:6 to 2013:12. The standard errors are clustered on time.

Table 6 (Continued)

<i>High Net</i>	0.016 (4.73)***	0.020 (7.27)***	-0.001 (0.11)
<i>Low Net</i>	-0.011 (1.88)*	-0.018 (3.86)***	-0.025 (5.37)***
<i>High Net * Eday</i>	0.140 (6.28)***	0.139 (6.21)***	0.078 (2.67)***
<i>Low Net * Eday</i>	-0.113 (5.03)***	-0.111 (4.96)***	-0.158 (6.21)***
<i>High Net * Nday</i>	0.030 (5.40)***	0.031 (5.49)***	0.029 (4.81)***
<i>Low Net * Nday</i>	-0.042 (6.98)***	-0.041 (6.80)***	-0.050 (7.88)***
<i>High Net * Mon</i>	0.015 (2.01)**		
<i>High Net * Fri</i>	-0.005 (0.78)		
<i>Low Net * Mon</i>	-0.022 (1.68)*		
<i>Low Net * Fri</i>	-0.010 (0.88)		
<i>Eday</i>	0.067 (5.50)***	0.068 (5.51)***	-0.010 (0.70)
<i>Nday</i>	0.126 (20.01)***	0.126 (19.80)***	0.104 (15.91)***
<i>High Net * Macro</i>		-0.019 (2.39)**	
<i>Low Net * Macro</i>		0.009 (0.63)	
<i>High Net * Ret^2</i>			0.001 (2.05)**
<i>Low Net * Ret^2</i>			0.001 (2.01)**
<i>Ret^2</i>			0.004 (10.07)***
<i>Day Fixed Effects?</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 7: Anomaly Returns and Dynamic Risk on Earnings Announcement Days

In this table we ask whether discount rates and betas change on earnings announcement days, and whether any such effects can explain why anomaly returns are higher on earnings days. We sort firms each month on our aggregate anomaly variable, *Net*, and place them into high and low quintiles. We create dummy variables for high *Net* stocks and for low *Net* stocks, and we have dummy variables for earnings announcement days. We examine two sources of risk. *Market* is the daily realization of the CRSP value-weighted return index. *Factor* is the daily realization of a portfolio that is long high *Net* stocks and short low *Net* stocks. We interact both sources of risk with the earnings announcement dummies, and also include 3-way interactions between each of the high and low *Net* variables, each source of risk, and the earnings day dummy. The sample period is from 1979:6 to 2013:12. The standard errors are clustered on time.

Table 7: (Continued)

<i>High Net (H)</i>	0.024 (9.18)***		0.024 (13.71)***	0.024 (10.14)***
<i>Low Net (L)</i>	-0.016 (3.53)***		-0.016 (9.47)***	-0.016 (5.06)***
<i>High x Eday</i>	0.147 (6.52)***	0.157 (6.62)***	0.156 (7.03)***	0.148 (6.61)***
<i>Low x Eday</i>	-0.127 (5.65)***	-0.139 (6.07)***	-0.139 (6.75)***	-0.124 (5.70)***
<i>Eday (E)</i>	0.108 (8.64)***	0.109 (8.64)***	0.106 (8.58)***	0.107 (8.75)***
<i>H x Factor (F)</i>				0.291 (54.87)***
<i>L x Factor (F)</i>				-0.701 (135.03)***
<i>H x F x E</i>				0.176 (4.41)***
<i>L x F x E</i>				-0.217 (4.47)***
<i>Eday x Factor</i>				-0.196 (7.41)***
<i>H x Market (M)</i>			-0.086 (18.94)**	
<i>L x Market (M)</i>			0.298 (41.58)**	
<i>H x M. x E</i>			-0.057 (2.39)*	
<i>L x M x E</i>			-0.002 (0.09)	
<i>Eday x Market</i>			0.166 (9.91)**	
<i>Fixed Effects</i>	Day	Day x High x Low	Day	Day

Table 8: Analysts' Earnings Forecast Errors

In this table, we test whether anomalies are related to analysts' earnings forecast errors. The dependent variable is analysts' earnings forecast error, which is measured as the median earnings forecast minus the actual reported earnings (per IBES), scaled by last month's closing stock price. This variable is then winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We use the median quarterly earnings forecast from the latest IBES statistical period, or the last date that IBES computed its summary statistics for the firms' earnings forecasts. *Number of Estimates* is the number of analysts issuing forecasts. *Single Forecast* is a dummy equal to 1 if only one analyst makes a forecast for the firm and zero otherwise. *Dispersion* is the standard deviation of the forecasts scaled by stock price. We set dispersion equal to zero if *Single Forecast* is equal to 1. The variables *Long* and *Short* and the different anomaly samples are defined in the previous tables. For readability, we divide *Long* and *Short* by 100. The regressions include time-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on time. The sample contains 345,913 observations.

	Full Sample	Market	Valuation	Fundamental	Event
<i>High Net</i>	-0.045 (5.40)***	0.020 (1.77)*	-0.007 (2.69)***	-0.008 (4.02)***	-0.031 (12.82)***
<i>Low Net</i>	0.017 (2.36)**	-0.031 (3.64)***	0.022 (7.57)***	0.012 (4.40)***	0.020 (10.42)***
<i>Number of Estimates</i>	-0.004 (9.61)***	-0.003 (6.37)***	-0.005 (10.33)***	-0.004 (8.49)***	-0.004 (8.51)***
<i>Single Forecast</i>	0.280 (20.54)***	0.270 (19.56)***	0.276 (20.49)***	0.275 (20.28)***	0.278 (20.32)***
<i>Dispersion</i>	59.613 (19.57)***	59.312 (19.38)***	59.148 (19.35)***	59.205 (19.24)***	59.274 (19.45)***
<i>Intercept</i>	0.028 (3.39)***	0.025 (3.08)***	0.012 (1.31)	0.018 (2.33)**	0.031 (3.17)***
<i>Month FE's?</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 9: Data Mining Tests

In this table, we conduct several tests of the hypothesis that anomaly returns can be explained by data mining. To create the *Net* anomaly variable we use the 97 cross-sectional anomalies studied in McLean and Pontiff (2016). For each stock-month observation, we sum up the number of long-side and short-side anomaly portfolios that the stock belongs to, thereby creating *Long* and *Short*. *Net* is equal to *Long* minus *Short*. We then merge this monthly dataset with daily stock return data from CRSP and with daily indicators for earnings announcement days and Dow Jones News stories, which we refer to as information days. We define an earnings day (Eday) or news day (Nday) as the 1-day window around an earnings announcement or news release. *Monthly* is the firm's contemporaneous monthly stock return. Out-of-sample (*OOS*) is like *Net*, only *OOS* constructed with anomalies that are out-of-sample, i.e., i.e., past the sample date of the original study to document the anomaly. The final two columns report regressions estimated in samples of large and small stocks only, where large (small) stocks are those above (below) the media market capitalization on day t . The control variables include lagged values for each of the past 10 days for stock returns, stock returns squared, and trading volume. The dependent variable, daily return, is expressed in basis points. The sample period is from 1979:6 to 2013:12. The standard errors are clustered on time.

Table 9 (Continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>Monthly</i>	<i>Net + Monthly</i>	<i>Large Stocks Only</i>	<i>Small Stocks Only</i>	<i>Out-of-Sample</i>
<i>Net</i>		-0.137 (2.23)**	-0.044 (0.80)	0.061 (1.08)	
<i>Net * Eday</i>		0.738 (3.19)***	0.715 (2.54)*	3.067 (8.24)**	
<i>Net * Nday</i>		0.237 (4.13)***	0.020 (0.36)	0.241 (2.84)**	
<i>Monthly</i>	5.225 (129.53)***	5.227 (129.19)***	5.348 (96.02)**	5.127 (132.29)**	
<i>Monthly * Eday</i>	11.620 (43.38)***	11.612 (43.35)***	11.949 (31.12)**	11.125 (35.68)**	
<i>Monthly * Nday</i>	2.284 (25.19)***	2.282 (25.17)***	1.867 (22.93)**	2.869 (18.28)**	
<i>OOS</i>					0.384 (6.05)***
<i>OOS * Eday</i>					2.165 (8.54)***
<i>OOS * Nday</i>					0.179 (3.03)***
<i>Eday</i>	-0.118 (8.98)***	-0.111 (8.55)***	-0.006 (0.37)	-0.272 (16.57)**	0.090 (8.71)***
<i>Nday</i>	0.060 (8.85)***	0.062 (9.35)***	0.044 (9.65)**	0.078 (8.55)**	0.124 (18.91)***
<i>Day Fixed Effects?</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 10: Data Mining? Evidence from Analysts Forecast Errors

In this table, we test whether anomalies are related to analysts' earnings forecast errors. The dependent variable is analysts' earnings forecast error, which is measured as the median earnings forecast minus the actual reported earnings (per IBES), scaled by last month's closing stock price. This variable is then winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We use the median quarterly earnings forecast from the latest IBES statistical period, or the last date that IBES computed its summary statistics for the firms' earnings forecasts. *Number of Estimates* is the number of analysts issuing forecasts. *Single Forecast* is a dummy equal to 1 if only one analyst makes a forecast for the firm and zero otherwise. *Dispersion* is the standard deviation of the forecasts scaled by stock price. We set dispersion equal to zero if *Single Forecast* is equal to 1. *Monthly* is the firm's contemporaneous monthly stock return. *High Net* and *Low Net* are the anomaly dummy variables, which are defined in the previous tables. *High OOS* and *Low OOS* are versions of *High Net* and *Low Net* created using out-of-sample anomalies only. For readability, we divide all of the anomaly variables by 100. The regressions include time-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on time. The sample contains 345,431 observations.

	<i>Monthly</i>	<i>Monthly + High Net and Low Net</i>	<i>High OOS and Low OOS</i>
<i>Monthly</i>	-1.560 (21.62)***	-1.557 (21.58)***	
<i>Long</i>		-0.030 (3.52)***	
<i>Short</i>		0.013 (1.76)*	
<i>OOS_Long</i>			-0.046 (5.56)***
<i>OOS_Short</i>			0.016 (2.22)**
<i>Number of Estimates</i>	-0.004 (7.49)***	-0.004 (8.29)***	-0.004 (9.64)***
<i>Single Forecast</i>	0.272 (20.46)***	0.276 (20.69)***	0.279 (20.47)***
<i>Dispersion</i>	58.402 (19.54)***	58.440 (19.57)***	59.260 (19.54)***
<i>Intercept</i>	0.040 (5.34)***	0.043 (5.39)***	0.029 (3.57)***
<i>Month Fixed Effects?</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes

Appendix

Biased Expectations and Returns on News and Non-News Days

Consider a multi-period economy with three securities--a risk free security with perfectly elastic supply and the stocks of two risky firms. A representative, risk-neutral agent invests his endowment to maximize expected terminal period wealth. The investor incorrectly perceives expected future cashflows for both firms to be equal to zero, and thus, the price of each stock is determined by its periodically-announced accumulated cash.

High, h , and low, l , type firms are indexed by i . Each period's cashflow is $\gamma_t^i + \varepsilon_t^i$. The variables ε_t^i 's, γ_t^h , and γ_t^l are independent random variables that have respective expected values of zero, M_γ , and $-M_\gamma$, where $M_\gamma > 0$. The γ_t^i 's reflect cashflow shocks that the investor mistakenly thinks have zero means. This results in high-type firm's cashflows being underestimated and low-type firm's cashflows being overestimated.

The revealed accumulated cash is $\sum_{t=1}^m (\gamma_t^i + \varepsilon_t^i)$, where m is the last period the firm made an announcement. The assumptions of risk neutrality and perfectly elastic supply of the zero-return riskless asset, imply that the returns the risk-neutral agent "expects" are zero. In no-news periods the prices of risky stocks do not change and the risky stocks earn zero returns. In news periods, the return of each stock is the post-news price minus the price following the last news release. Denoting the period of the last news release as j , the time k return of each stock is $\sum_{t=j}^k (\gamma_t^i + \varepsilon_t^i)$, the expectation of which is $(k - j)M_\gamma$ for the high-type stock and $-(k - j)M_\gamma$ for the low-type stock. Thus, when news is revealed the high-type stock has positive expected returns and the low-type stock has negative expected returns. This result holds regardless of whether the news is anticipated. When no news is revealed both stocks have zero expected returns.

Table A1: The Relative Importance of Information Days

In this table, we document the relative importance of information days in explaining anomaly returns. For each firm-day observation, we first measure the firm's abnormal return as the firm's return minus the value-weighted market return on the same day. Then, for each anomaly portfolio, we sum up all of the abnormal returns on information days and on non-information days separately. We also count the number of days that are information days and the number of non-information days for each anomaly portfolio. This exercise allows us to say what percentage of an anomaly's days are information days and what percentage of the anomaly's returns is from information days. We conduct this exercise for each of the anomaly portfolios in our sample and report the average. We define an information day as the 3-day window around an earnings announcement or news release, i.e., days $t-1$, t , and $t+1$. Panel B considers just earnings announcement days. In Panel B we limit the sample to firms that have 4 earnings announcements days (in our data) during the year. The sample period is from 1979:6 to 2013:12.

Table A1: (Continued)

Panel A: Both Earnings Announcement Days and Dow Jones News Days					
Long Side	Full Sample	Market	Valuation	Fundamental	Event
<i>Percentage of Days</i>	0.345	0.319	0.326	0.358	0.367
<i>Percentage of Returns</i>	0.801	0.959	0.863	0.741	0.683
Short Side	Full Sample	Market	Valuation	Fundamental	Event
<i>Percentage of Days</i>	0.346	0.336	0.345	0.367	0.338
<i>Percentage of Returns</i>	0.848	1.077	0.747	0.766	0.766

Table A1: (Continued)

Panel B: Earnings Announcement Days Only					
Long Side	Full Sample	Market	Valuation	Fundamental	Event
<i>Percentage of Days</i>	0.049	0.050	0.049	0.049	0.048
<i>Percentage of Returns</i>	0.172	0.163	0.172	0.186	0.166

Short Side	Full Sample	Market	Valuation	Fundamental	Event
<i>Percentage of Days</i>	0.048	0.047	0.048	0.048	0.048
<i>Percentage of Returns</i>	0.177	0.215	0.153	0.155	0.177

Table A2: Anomaly Returns and Market Conditions

In this table, we ask whether anomaly return and anomaly returns on information days vary with market conditions. We measure market conditions using the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index, a recession indicator variable, and a proxy for market volatility, which is the squared return of the S&P 500. We first generate monthly coefficients. by performing regressions each month of daily returns on *High Net*, *Low Net*, interactions between the *Net* variables and earnings day and new day dummies, and the control variables used throughout the paper (e.g., Table 4). We then regress the resulting monthly coefficients on the market conditions variables and a time variable, which takes a value of 1 during the first month of our sample and increases by every month. The sample period is from 1979:6 to 2013:12.

	<i>High_Net</i>	<i>Low_Net</i>	<i>High x Eday</i>	<i>Low x Eday</i>	<i>High x Nday</i>	<i>Low x Nday</i>
<i>Sentiment</i>	-0.106 (0.34)	-0.214 (1.06)	-1.139 (0.58)	0.052 (0.07)	-2.064 (1.75)*	0.253 (0.59)
<i>Recession</i>	0.344 (0.64)	-0.154 (0.43)	1.964 (0.67)	1.132 (0.80)	0.502 (0.34)	0.349 (0.41)
<i>Volatility</i>	-0.001 (7.41)***	0.000 (1.03)	-0.005 (7.45)***	-0.003 (3.04)***	-0.001 (5.31)***	-0.007 (6.64)***
<i>Time</i>	-0.005 (3.04)***	-0.000 (0.30)	-0.013 (1.15)	0.001 (0.33)	-0.017 (2.62)***	0.024 (9.60)***
<i>Intercept</i>	1.969 (3.60)***	-0.088 (0.30)	7.404 (2.08)*	-3.302 (2.76)***	6.307 (2.95)***	-9.389 (11.66)***
<i>R</i> ²	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.29
<i>N</i>	420	420	420	420	420	420

Table A3: Analyst Forecast Error and Anomaly Returns

In this table we regress daily stock returns on *Net*, an earnings day dummy (*Eday*), a forecast error dummy (*FSD*) that is equal to 1 if the forecast error is more than one standard deviation from the sample mean, and interactions between *Net* and the two dummies. The control variables include lagged values for each of the past 10 days for stock returns, stock returns squared, and trading volume. Standard errors are clustered on time. The sample period is from 1979:6 to 2013:12.

<i>Net</i>	0.373 (5.99) ^{***}
<i>Net x Eday</i>	0.796 (3.07) ^{***}
<i>Net x FSD</i>	6.792 (10.51) ^{***}
<i>Eday</i>	0.117 (11.05) ^{***}
<i>FSD</i>	0.052 (1.53) ^{***}
<i>Day FE</i>	Yes

Table A4: An Optimal Anomaly Variable and Information Days

In this table, we regress daily stock returns on the anomaly variable *Optimal*, *Optimal* interacted with earnings day and news day dummies, the dummies individually, and controls. *Optimal* is constructed using a rolling 10-year window. We estimate a regression of stock returns on the 97 different anomaly variables. We take the fitted values from this regression and use them as our expected return variable over the subsequent month. The control variables include lagged values for each of the past 10 days for stock returns, stock returns squared, and trading volume. Standard errors are clustered on time. The sample period is from 1979:6 to 2013:12.

<i>Optimal</i>	2.982 (13.83)***
<i>Optimal x Eday</i>	12.694 (12.86)***
<i>Optimal x Nday</i>	0.570 (1.27)
<i>Eday</i>	0.041 (3.64)***
<i>Nday</i>	0.112 (15.72)***
<i>Day Fixed Effects?</i>	Yes